In 1914 CE, the disaster of the Tannenberg Campaign confirmed for many of the Russian people that their government was fundamentally incompetent as well as astonishingly corrupt.
When in 1917 the Russian peasants figured out that the paper currency the government was issuing was worthless, they stopped providing food for the cities and armies, and the government of the Russian Empire collapsed.
The German and Austro-Hungarian empires, starved and impoverished by Allied blockades, and less and less capable of dealing with increasingly large numbers of fresh American troops on the Western Front, lasted a year longer.
In March of 1918 the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk marked the end of World War I for Russia, though the fighting in the East scarcely paused.
The Russian Civil War [1917 to 1922] overlapped with the Russo-Polish War [1919 – 1920]. Poland tried to conquer the Ukraine, and Soviet Russia tried to extend its western borders to their pre-war positions while exporting socialism of an international variety. Poland won the final battle at the gates of Warsaw. By the time its civil war ended, Russia was shorn of approximately one-third of its productive land and one-third of its population.
The German victory over Russia and subsequent Allied victory over Germany resulted in a welter of relatively small states, organized largely on the basis of ethnicity, running from the Baltic to the Mediterranean and Black Seas. These countries, including Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria, reaped major benefits from the untidy end of World War I in central Europe. But none of them were powerful enough to defend their gains in the neighborhood of an embittered Germany and an aggrieved Russia. Belarus, which declared independence in 1917 only to be conquered and assimilated by Soviet Russia in 1919, exemplifies the problems all would face to a greater or lesser degree.
The weakness of these small states might not have mattered so much if the League of Nations had been able to guarantee their security. But the Americans, who had worked so hard to create this multi-national organization, failed to join or support it. It has been said that the times were not propitious for diplomacy, but Germany and Russia could agree diplomatically on how to overcome their considerable differences in order to remove Poland from the map of Europe again, as the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of 1939 and subsequent events demonstrated.
The Turkish expulsion [1914 – 1923] of ethnic Greeks from Anatolian and Pontic lands they had inhabited for over a thousand years did not inspire confidence in the willingness of great powers to defend the principles of national sovereignty.
The English and French abandoned the Czechs to the Germans at the Munich summit in 1938. The Poles, who were high on Germany’s acquisition list, helped themselves to a sliver of Czechoslovakia at that time. Poland’s turn to be dismembered came soon, following German agitation regarding the Danzig Corridor between East Prussia and northeastern Germany.
The United States of America appeared to learn about the dangers of leaving Central and Eastern Europe chock full of states too weak to defend themselves from the failures of the peace treaties ending World War I and American participation in World War II. The United Nations [founded in 1945] and North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO, founded in 1949] with strong American support appeared to be successful in preventing the outbreak of major international hostilities in Europe after World War II until the breakup of Yugoslavia [1989 – 1992] began anew the metastasis of small states in the region. Russia’s counter to NATO, the Warsaw Pact [1955 – 1991], usually kept the small countries on Russia’s western perimeter quiescent.
After the Second World War, several small or recently revived nations on or near Russia’s western border made the mistake of believing American governments would aid them in their struggles for true national independence and freedom from Russian domination. This worked out badly for Hungarians , Czechs , the non-Russian residents of Crimea  and the Ukrainians [2014 and following], to name a few.
The signal failure of European powers to effectively manage the replacement of Yugoslavia by six small states paled in comparison with the utter futility of Western European efforts to affect the dissolution of the Soviet Union into 15 independent states in December of 1991.
After Germany reunited in 1990, the United States of America could not resist the temptation of trying to extend NATO membership to some of the minnows on Russia’s western and south-western frontiers. Some of the lessons of World War I, learned at great cost in World War II, seem to have been forgotten by America.
A mutual defense pact between a superpower and a former province of the Russian Empire is not merely asymmetrical. It is an ambush waiting to happen, perpetually threatening to maneuver the great power into conflicts with Russia over issues that are not key strategic interests, however important they seem to be to the Lilliputians.
In other words, the small states offer intractable problems but little in the way of benefits to their Western protectors, but leaving their well-being to the untender mercies of their great power neighbors runs the risk of detonating another World War. In early August of 1914 it was a common witticism in Western Europe to note that Serbia was a very small country, minimizing the severity of the problems that might arise from Serbia’s complicity in the assassination of the Austro-Hungarian Empire’s Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Wiser heads replied that nevertheless it would be a very large war.
Since the conclusion of World War II Americans might have learned that they can have a leading role in a world free of major conflict if they exercise responsible and engaged leadership, or a spurious freedom by retreating into isolationism. Americans cannot have it both ways. But this is a lesson Americans resist learning, and are quick to forget.
- Peter Vansittart’s Voices 1870 – 1914 and Voices from the Great War present the history and culture of Europe from the Franco-Prussian War through the end of World War I by providing observations and comments of contemporary artists, politicians, soldiers, and civilians. His pointillistic portrait of Europe’s somnambulatory stumbling into the path of self-destruction is deft, illuminating, and tragic.
- J. Goodspeed’s The German Wars provides among other things a useful summary of developments between the wars, set in a context that illuminates their continuity.
- Isaac Babel’s Red Cavalry transforms he author’s experiences during the Russo-Polish War of 1919 – 1920 into short stories that are masterpieces of that art.
- Timothy Snyder’s Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin  reevaluates the history of the nations caught between Germany and Soviet Russia in the 20th